Safety Regulations and Accident Investigation: Jurisdictional Conflicts of C.A.B. and C.A.A. - Part II by Sweeney, Edward C.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 17 | Issue 3 Article 3
1950
Safety Regulations and Accident Investigation:
Jurisdictional Conflicts of C.A.B. and C.A.A. - Part
II
Edward C. Sweeney
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and
Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Edward C. Sweeney, Safety Regulations and Accident Investigation: Jurisdictional Conflicts of C.A.B. and C.A.A. - Part II, 17 J. Air L. &
Com. 269 (1950)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol17/iss3/3
SAFETY REGULATIONS AND ACCIDENT
*INVESTIGATION: JURISDICTIONAL
CONFLICTS OF C.A.B. AND C.A.A.-
PART 11*
By EDWARD C. SWEENEY
Professor of Law, Northwestern University, and Editor of the
JOURNAL; Williams College, B.A., Northwestern Law School, J.D.
and LL.M. On leave of absence to U.S. Senate Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce as Professional Staff Member in charge
of staff investigation of the operational efficiency of the airline indus-
try, pursuant to S. Res. 50; Vice-President, Youth Activities, Na-
tional Aeronautics Association; Commander, USNR. Formerly,
Survey Officer for the Task Force Committee on Independent Regu-
latory Commissions of the (Hoover) Commission on Organization of
the Executive Branch of the Government, 1948; Staff Consultant on
Government Organization to Joint Congressional Aviation Policy
Board, 1948; Legal Adviser to President's Air Policy Commission,
1947.
REORGANIZATION PLANS OF 1950
HE statutory responsibilities of the Civil Aeronautics Board and
the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics were reviewed in Part one.
On May 24, 1950, Reorganization Plans Numbers 5, 13 and 21 of 1950
became effective. Plan No. 13 was designed to strengthen the internal
administration of the BQard by making the Chairman, rather than the
five-man Board as a whole, responsible for its day-to-day administra-
tion.' Plan No. 5 transferred to the Secretary of Commerce all func-
tions of the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics and of the Civil Aero-
nautics Administration, thus centralizing in the Secretary full respon-
* Continued from Spring issue of JOURNAL, 17 J. Air L. & Com. 141 (1950).
Portions of Staff Report on the Civil Aeronautics Board submitted to the Com-
mission on Organization of the Executive Branch of. the Government, September-
November, 1948.
1Reorganization Plan No. 13 of 1950 reads: "SECTION 1. Transfer of func-
tions to the Chairman.-(a) Subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of this
section, there are hereby transferred from the Civil Aeronautics Board, herein-
after referred to as the Board, to the Chairman of the Board, hereinafter referred
to as the Chairman, the executive and administrative functions of the Board,
including functions of the Board with respect to (1) the appointment and super-
vision of personnel employed under the Board, (2) the distribution of business
among such personnel and among administrative units of the Board, and (3) the
use and expenditure of funds.
"(b) (1) In carrying out any of his functions under the provisions of this
section the Chairman shall be governed by general policies of the Board and by
such regulatory decisions, findings, and determinations as the Board may by law
be authorized to make.
"(2) The appointment by the Chairman of the heads of major administrative
units under the Board shall be subject to the approval of the Board.
"(3) Personnel employed regularly and full time in the immediate offices of
members of the Board other than the Chairman shall not be. affected by the
provisions of this reorganization plan.
"(4) There are hereby reserved to the Board its functions with respect to
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sibility for all the activities of the CAA.2 Reorganization Plan No. 21
effected a basic reorganization of the United States Maritime Commis-
sion and established an Under Secretary of Commerce for Transporta-
tion, to perform such duties as the Secretary of Commerce shall pre-
scribe. 2a This plan created a new three-man Federal Maritime Board
within the Department of Commerce for housekeeping purposes,
stripped of most administrative responsibility, but with specified regu-
latory powers to be exercised "independent of the Secretary." The CAB
and the Department have had this relationship since the Reorganiza-
tion Plans of 1940.2b Plan 21 also created a new Maritime Administra-
tor, responsible to the Secretary of Commerce, like the Administrator
of Civil Aeronautics, but provided that he would also be the Chairman
of the new Federal Maritime Board. As this is the most recent and
drastic reorganization of an independent regulatory commission, the
precise relationship between the new Maritime Board and the Secre-
tary of Commerce, especially the division of responsibilities relating to
the award of subsidies for ship construction and operation, are being
watched closely by aviation interests. 2c
revising budget estimates and with respect to determining upon the distribution
of appropriated funds according to major programs and purposes.
"SEc. 2. Performance of transferred functions.-The Chairman may from
time to time make such provisions as he shall deem appropriate authorizing the
performance by any officer, employee, or administrative unit under his jurisdiction
of any function transferred to the Chairman by the provisions of this reorgani-
zation plan."
2 Reorganization Plan No. 5 of 1950-Department of Commerce: 4SEcTION 1.
Transfer of functions to the Secretary.-(a) Except as otherwise provided in
subsection (b) of this section, there are hereby transferred to the Secretary of
Commerce all functions of all other officers of the Department of Commerce and
all functions of all agencies and employees of such Department.
(b) This section shall not apply to the functions vested by the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (60 Stat. 237) in hearing examiners employed by the Depart-
ment of Commerce, nor to the functions of the Civil Aeronautics Board, of the
Inland Waterways Corporation, or of the Advisory Board of the Inland Water-
ways Corporation."
2& Reorganization Plan No. 21 of 1950, Section 301.
2b See page 142 of Part one, 17 J. Air L. & Com. 144 (1950).
201n response to an inquiry of Senator Warren G. Magnuson, Chairman of
the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine and Maritime Matters of the Interstate
and Foreign Commerce Committee, the Secretary of Commerce, Charles Sawyer,
went into significant detail in a letter of April 14, 1950. He wrote:
"In your letter you asked for my views on certain aspects of the transfer
of the functions of the Maritime Commission under Reorganization Plan No. 21
1950. This Plan establishes a Federal Maritime Board and a Maritime Admin-
istration in the Department of Commerce.
"The Board would have two principal functions: regulatory powers relating
generally to rates and services, to agreements among carriers, and to trade prac-
tices; and powers to award subsidies for the construction and operation of ships.
The other functions now lodged in the Maritime Commission would be transferred
to the Secretary of Commerce, subject to delegation to the Maritime Administra-
tor, who would also be the Chairman of the Board.
"In the exercise of its regulatory powers over rates and services, over agree-
ments between carriers, and over trade practices, the Board would, under
Section 106 of the Plan, be independent of the Secretary of Commerce and would
be free to report directly to the Congress. The present independence of decision
enjoyed by the Maritime Commission would, therefore, in all respects be continued
in the Board, with respect to these quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial regulatory
functions.
"If, in the exercise of these functions, the Board should wish to avail itself
of any of the facilities of the Department, I should of course be glad to see that
the Board is accorded full cooperation. However, such cooperation would not,
in my opinion, interfere with the independence of the Board in the exercise of
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SHOULD RESPONSIBILITY FOR ISSUANCE OF SAFETY REGULATIONS
BE TRANSFERRED TO CAA
It has been shown in Part one that the Civil Aeronautics Board
promulgates the Civil Air Regulations. The Administrator of Civil
Aeronautics implements Board action by carrying out the primary
duties of administration and enforcement. Aircraft safety regulations
are voluminous and technical and include safety standards of all kinds.
They are designed to insure safety for aircraft, airmen and air navi-
gation.
its regulatory functions. On the contrary, the decisions of the Board on regula-
tory matters would be made with complete independence, on the basis of the facts
before the Board, subject only to court review. its consideration of regulatory
problems would not be subject to supervision or control by the Department, and
its decisions would not be subject to review, or approval, or reversal by the
Secretary or the Department. This method of operation has been found satis-
factory in the case of the CAB, and I foresee no difficulty in applying the same
principle to the regulatory functions of the Federal Maritime Board.
"In the exercise of the powers with respect to the award of subsidies which
are delegated to the Board by the Plan, the Board is to be guided by the general
policies of the Secretary of Commerce, under Section 106 of the Plan, but its ac-
tions with respect to making, amending, and terminating subsidy contracts under
Section 105(1) are to be final.
"This aspect of the Plan appears to me to be both appropriate and practicable.
This arrangement facilitates and ensures coordinating the subsidy program with
the programs and general policies of the Executive Branch relating to national
defense and the national transportation program. At the same time, it leaves
to the independent judgment of the Board the determination of the individual
concerns which are to receive the subsidy contracts and the amounts of the
individual subsidies.
"I should like to make it clear that under the Plan the Secretary has no
authority either to award a subsidy or to direct the action of the Board on a
subsidy application. Here again, I would expect full cooperation between the
Board and the department: The Department will need the views of the Board in
establishing general policies for the subsidy program, to ensure that the general
policies will be workable and realistic; the Board may, on occasion, wish the
views of the Department with respect to the application of the general policies.
Cooperation and consultation of this sort need not, and I am convinced will not,
affect the ability of the Board to make final decisions with respect to making,
awarding and terminating individual subsidy contracts, decisions which will not,
under the Plan, be subject to review or reversal by the Secretary.
"Under the Plan, the Federal Maritime Board is to be an agency within
the Department of Commerce. This status does -not, in my view, give the Secre-
tary or Department any authority over the regulatory functions which the Board
is to exercise independently, nor does it give the Secretary or the Department
authority to alter or reverse the actions of the Board with respect to those subsidy
functions as to which its actions are final."
"At the present time I am not prepared to make any proposals for funda-
mental revisions of the basic shipping legislation. I propose, if the Plan takes
effect, to make a thorough review of the present merchant marine program, and
if it appears from this review that changes in legislation would make the program
more effective, I would submit for Congressional consideration recommendations
for appropriate changes in the present laws.
"Until careful studies have been made it would not be possible to indicate
the precise place which promotion of the merchant marine should have in an
overall Federal program for transportation. As I indicated in my report to
the President, I am strongly in favor of the national transportation policy set
forth in the Transportation Act of 1940, which provides for the recognition and
preservation of the inherent advantage of each form of transportation and the
promotion of safe, adequate, economical, and efficient service as well as the
fostering of sound economic conditions in the field of transportation. I am con-
vinced that adherence to this policy in domestic transportation will result in a
flourishing domestic fleet available for use by the commerce of the United States.
I also recognize that, because of our higher costs, subsidies are necessary for
merchant shipping operating in international trade, if we are to remain a major
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Whenever one agency must take a comprehensive set of technical
regulations issued by another and implement and enforce them, there
are bound to be contructions placed upon the regulations not intended
by the promulgating agency. Enforcement policies ultimately deter-
mine what regulations really mean in practice. These differences have
occurred and given rise to friction and misunderstanding among the
staffs of the CAB, the CAA, and representatives of the aviation indus-
try.
To minimize misunderstandings in interpretations and to facilitate
amendments to the Civil Air Regulations, a special CAA-CAB Co-
ordinating Committee was established in 1946. It has helped to bring
the staffs together and resolve differences of opinion. Techniques of
working together have now become acceptable and the committee
machinery is coming into disuse.
It has been mentioned that the aviation industry and the Admin-
istrator have stated that they consider the present Civil Air Regulations
too voluminous and too detailed and recommend that they be revised
and simplified. What is needed, it is stated, is for the Board to change
drastically its basic approach towards safety regulation and restrict its
regulation to major policies affecting safety. It is not entirely clear
from the representations made by the Administrator to the Board in
1948 whether his supplemental rules and Operations Manuals are
to be simplified and generalized as well as the Board's Civil Air Regu-
lations. To give genuine recognition to self-regulation by manufac-
turers, airlines and other parts of the industry, the CAA should also
relax many detailed regulations and procedures.
The Board is not opposed to simplification and has for some time
announced a policy of permitting industry greater self-regulation and
participation in formulating improved operational practices. Progress
along this line appears intolerably slow. The Board has stated its
intentions to revise extensively many of the Parts of the CAR's. The
delay may in part be due to the great size of the undertaking and to
the extremely small staff undertaking to plan, study and draft the
revisions, as well as an attitude that speed should always be sacrificed
to accuracy.
shipping power and if our merchant fleet is to make an adequate contribution
to national defense.
"Your letter also inquired as to the general policy contemplated as regards
the respective spheres of authority of the proposed Maritime Administrator, the
Under Secretary for Transportation, and myself.
"The Maritime Administrator would be responsible for the operations of
his agency and would be vested with suitable authority to fulfill that responsi-
bility. While the Department requires adherence to certain administrative stand-
ards and practices in the interests of economy and progressive management, it is
my policy to give operating bureau wide operating latitude. This policy would
apply to the Maritime Administration, in conformance with the administrative
pattern of the Department prevailing with respect to the Bureau of Public Roads,
Civil Aeronautics Administration, and other major agencies."
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Proposals to Concentrate Authority in One Agency
Opinions differ widely as to the need for organizational changes
in the safety regulation field. The Department of Commerce has urged
that promulgation of rules should be transferred to the CAA so that
the single agency in daily touch with the problem could make, interpret
and enforce the regulations and keep them up to date.8 It is asserted
that this method will promote efficiency and recognize the primary
technical nature of the Civil Air Regulations. The President's Air
Policy Commission sponsored this recommendation (Report page 135).
The Congressional Aviation Policy Board, on the other hand, rec-
ommended that the CAB should administer and enforce the safety
regulations as well as make them, and that the staff of the CAA ad-
ministering the regulations should be transferred to the CAB and
placed under the supervision of an Executive Director who would
be subject only to policy supervision by the Board (Recommendations,
Nos. 82, 84 and 89).
The CAB concurred generally in this recommendation and points
out that the Civil Air Regulations often have far reaching economic
affects and should therefore, be made by the agency primarily respon-
sible for the financial welfare of air carriers.4 Since many safety regu-
lations involve flight restrictions or add weight to the aircraft, their
economic effect is evident. For example, if the Board amends the regu-
lations to require a third crew member on large 4-engine equipment,
the payroll weight and engineering expense will be substantial. Since,
in the last analysis all aircraft safety is relative, the expense of safety
requirements plays an important role with carrier management.
The Congressional Policy Board suggested, however, that the Fed-
eral Airway Service in the Department of Commerce should make the
rules for the operation of the airways and airport traffic control facili-
ties as distinguished from all other rules related to the economic opera-
tion of aircraft and air services in flight and on the ground. This dis-
tinction appears to be too nebulous and would certainly lead to fric-
tions between the CAB and the Federal Airway Service.
Either of these would concentrate the rule-making power in one
agency. Through day-to-day administrative experience this agency
would acquire an intimate knowledge of the technical aspects of regu-
lations and their important economic implications. Thus, both pro-
posals would cure the evil of the present duality and permit one re-
sponsible agency to simplify and modernize the CAR's.
In passing, it should be mentioned that when the Civil Aeronautics
Act was under consideration in 1937 one of the proposals seriously con-
sidered was to give the ICC safety as well as economic regulation of
3 See Hearings on H.R. 6144 before House Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Committee, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., April 20, 1948, especially statement of Wm. C.
Foster, Under-Secretary of Commerce, page 28, et seq.
4 See Hearings on H.R. 6144, statement of Joseph J. O'Connell, CAB Chair-
man, page 71, et seq.
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commercial carriers, with the Department of Commerce retaining
safety regulation of private fliers. In practice, air carrier and private
flying regulation are separated in form in the Civil Air Regulations and
the administration and enforcement of the two areas of regulation are
handled by different CAA personnel. As non-commercial flying in-
creases in volume its problem will require greater decentralization and
administration at the state level, but at this time this proposal would
not seem desirable with the common use of airports, airway facilities
and traffic control by all classes of aviation and the need for uniform
traffic control.
The aviation industry and witnesses before the two policy commit-
tees and on the legislation considered by Congress appear to be divided
upon the merits of whether the CAB or the CAA should be the agency
to be given the entire responsibility for promulgating and administer-
ing safety regulations. While there is general concurrence that one
agency should handle both the rule-making and administration of
safety regulations, there is also recognition of the need for a disinter-
ested body representing the public to pass upon proposed regulations
about which government engineers and the industry are not in agree-
ment.
Public Law No. 872, approved July 1, 1948, is a step in this direc-
tion. It provides that the CAB may authorize the Administrator to
make such safety regulations as the Board deems desirable and that
the Board may provide for discretionary review of CAA proposed
regulations.
The law does not specify what responsibility CAB retains after dele-
gazing rule-making authority to the Administrator, i.e., whether it is
obligated to retain a staff to judge the adequacy of CAA's rule-making
and to withdraw the delegation when it disagrees with CAA policy.
Recommendations to Hoover Commission's Committee on
Regulatory Commissions
The foregoing discussion appears to establish the desirability of
centralizing responsibility of both the rule-making and administration
functions of safety regulations in one agency. This is because of their
technical nature, the need for daily intimacy with changing industry
techniques, facility for prompt amendments and centralization of re-
sponsibility. To require two agencies to work so closely together as is
necessary for a rule-making agency dependent upon a second agency
for a great share of its technical advice and competency invites clashes
which impede progress. This should be avoided if possible. This ob-
jective can be accomplished by transferring the responsibility for
promulgating all Civil Air Regulations to the CAA.
Secondly, when industry and the CAA do not agree, provision
should be made for final decision by a disinterested competent body
which can balance safety and economic responsibilities. This appeals
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body would need only a small staff of technical advisors. While indus-
try may tend to appeal any proposed regulation which imposes greater
financial and technical burdens, if only to delay enactment, it is be-
lieved that this provision for appeal to a separate agency is preferable
to merely leaving the matter to publication and hearing pursuant to
the Administrative Procedure Act. While every appeal may be inter-
preted as an attack on a safety measure on economic grounds, this must
be recognized as a real issue involved in most new regulations that
cannot be avoided or concealed by government.
This second objective can therefore best be achieved by a provision
that when a proposed regulation is published by CAA in accordance
with the Administrative Procedure Act, interested parties may petition
for discretionary review by the CAB.
These changes may be accomplished under Public Law 872 with
the full cooperation of CAB, or better, by specific amendment to the
Civil Aeronautics Act.
Finally, it is recommended that the philosophy of safety regulation
for civil aviation by all agencies of the Federal Government be dras-
tically changed by revising the Civil Air Regulations both as to form
and scope in order to begin a gradual generalization of safety regula-
tions with the ultimate objective of placing responsibility for de-
tailed operating procedures and practices directly on the aviation
industry.
SHOULD RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL AIR
REGULATIONS BE TRANSFERRED TO CAA?
The Reorganization Plans of 1940 left an unsatisfactory division of
responsibility between the Board and the Administrator in regard to
enforcing Civil Air Regulations. Briefly, the Administrator is the pri-
mary enforcing agency with a field staff charged with apprehending and
reporting violations and acts as prosecuting agent before a CAB Hear-
ing Examiner in suspension and revocation cases. He is invested with
power to reprimand a violator, to compromise a civil penalty or to
deny an application for renewal of a certificate, while the Board is
vested with the power to suspend or revoke the violator's certificate of
competency.
In a given case the Administrator may consider that the violator's
certificate should be suspended and when it reaches the Board for
decision on the suspension it may consider that a civil penalty was
more appropriate. Theoretically, proceedings to suspend a certificate
do not prevent the Administrator from also threatening to collect a
civil penalty, or on the other hand, to issue a new certificate to a vio-
lator as soon as the Board has suspended a previous one, thus nullifying
the action of the Board.
Delay: In practice the most serious objection of the Board's han-
dling of suspension and revocation cases is the undue length of time it
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
takes the Board to process decisions, and the complete lack of personal
interest shown in such proceedings by Board members. Many of the
airmen suspension cases, such as a student pilot carrying a passenger
contrary to regulations, are minor in nature. In many such cases the
Examiner has recommended a suspension of the pilot's privileges for
30 to 60 days, but the decision usually does not become effective until
a year or more after the offense occurred. This is inexcusable.
Dual Authority: In addition to delays, experience indicates two
fundamental difficulties in the present enforcement procedure. The
first is that two separate groups of hearing officers (the Board's Exam-
iners and CAA staff) are authorized to hear and impose different sanc-
tions: neither is bound by the other's decision and each has jurisdic-
tion over only one sanction.
Denial of Hearing: The second is that in practice the violator is
denied an opportunity of having the civil penalty heard and deter-
mined by an independent tribunal. The choice presented to the al-
leged violator is either to pay the compromise penalty offered by the
CAA, usually in an amount under $100, or to have the issue tried
before a United States District Court in a $1,000 civil penalty action.
Since to defend the action would cost the alleged violator more in
time, attorney fees and costs, than to pay the compromise, an innocent
airman may be forced to accede to the Administrator's suggested com-
promise. This procedure has been the basis of complaints by airmen
and aeronautical associations.
Proposals for Local Enforcement of Safety Regulations
Both CAB and CAA recognize that enforcement of Civil Air Regu-
lations with respect to flight activities of non-commercial pilots and
local operators is essentially a local problem and that as much as pos-
sible of the enforcement responsibility for this class of flight activity
should be turned over to local and State officials as soon as possible.
The President's Air Policy Commission (Report, page 126) and
the Congressional Aviation Policy Board (Recommendation 24 (b))
recommended that federal statutes be amended to give State Courts
and agencies concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate violations of the
Civil Air Regulation which did not involve certificated air carriers.6
I Hearings were held in May, 1948, on legislation to carry out this
recommendation. Serious differences of opinion were brought out at
these hearings as to how far the State courts should be authorized to go
and as to the best methods of meeting procedural problems.7 Should
State jurisdiction be extended to revocation of federal certificates as
6 See comprehensive discussion of this problem by Louis E. Black, Jr., "Uni-
formity in Air Safety Regulation; Cooperative Federalism Applied," 15 JoUR. AIR
LAW & COM. 181 (1948).
7 See Hearings on H.R. 6147, "Local Enforcement of Safety Regulations" be-
fore House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, May 4, 1948, and hear-
ings on S. 2452 before Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on
May 17, 1948.
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well as civil penalties? State officials asserted that criminal procedure
would be the only effective procedure for them to follow. That basic-
ally the only additional authority they need would be authority to
suspend the exercise of federal pilot certificates of competency for
limited periods of time for violations involving "stunt" or reckless
flying.8 The entire subject is undergoing further study by interested
groups under the sponsorship of the CAA and State aviation officials.
Proposals to Improve Federal Enforcement
A number of proposals have been made to better correlate enforce-
ment procedures between CAB and CAA if the entire responsibility
for safety rule-making and enforcement is not assigned to one or the
other of the agencies.
The Board has recommended that both civil penalty and suspen-
sion proceedings be handled by the Board's Examiners with a right of
appeal to the Board in suspension or revocation cases as at- present,
and to the District Court in civil penalty cases. This procedure would
relieve the CAA from passing judgment on violations it uncovers and
prosecutes, but would greatly increase the responsibility of the Board
and might further delay the handling of cases.
The Administrator has refined this proposal by recommending that
CAB safety Examiners should be designated as commissioners of the
Federal District Courts like the commissioners designated to hear
petty crimes in the National Parks and federal territories (18 USCA
576a). This would give the Examiner power to determine civil pen-
alties in a judicial manner and would provide a more expeditious ap-
peal procedure to the Federal Courts.
Recommendations to Hoover Commission's Committee on
Regulatory Commissions
It is suggested that the proposal recommended by the Administrator
be adopted; that each United States District Court appoint an Avia-
tion Commissioner from among the Safety Hearing Examiners em-
ployed by the CAB. Depending on the work load the same Examiner
might be designated to act as commissioner in two or more districts.
He should have jurisdiction to hear and act upon all actions for mone-
tary penalties and actions to suspend or revoke all classes of safety
certificates.
In the event of finding of a violation the Commissioner could im-
pose a civil penalty up to $1,000, or suspend any air safety certificate
issued to the violator, or both. An appeal would lie from his judgment
imposing a civil penalty to the District Court, and from his judgment
suspending or revoking a certificate to the CAB from whose decision
8 See Statement of National Association of State Aviation Officials in regard
to H.R. 6147, reprinted in 15 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE 325 (Summer
issue, 1948).
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an appeal could ultimately be taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals.
The right of an accused to demand a trial by jury of any issue of fact,
if the value in controversy exceeds $20, must be recognized and provi-
sion made for such trials before the District Court.
The proposal should provide for bringing complaints in two ways:
(1) they would be brought in the name of the United States and prose-
cuted by the Administrator under the direction of the Attorney Gen-
eral, (2) the law enforcement officers of any State could file and prose-
cute complaints arising out of violations within that State of the
federal Air Traffic rules governing the navigation of aircraft, safe alti-
tude of flight, and the prevention of collisions, unless the alleged vio-
lator is operating an aircraft under the terms of an air carrier operating
certificate. With respect to the specific violations mentioned in (2)
above, consideration should be given to amending federal laws so as
to authorize state aviation authorities and courts of record to suspend
federal airmen's certificates of competency for periods from 30 to 60
days.
This recommendation meets the basic difficulties outlined above.
It concentrates responsibility in one set of Examiners upon whom re-
sponsibility for delays may be fixed. It provides for an impartial tri-
bunal to impose a fixed monetary penalty, civil in nature, about which
there would be no negotiation or bargaining. In addition, the proposal
realizes the objective of utilizing state enforcement personnel in the
handling of violation cases of local concern to reduce the number of
federal employees and widen the base of violation detection.
SHOULD RESPONSIBILITY FOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
BE TRANSFERRED TO AN INDEPENDENT AIR SAFETY BOARD?
Importance of Air Safety
No activity of the federal government with respect to civil aviation
attracts more public interest than the investigation of aircraft disasters
and the publication of the causes thereof. Fear of injury in aircraft
accidents, which is both real and exaggerated, is one of the serious de-
terrents to wide-spread public acceptance of air transportation. The
public appears to be more interested in commercial aircraft safety
than they are in the regularity, frequency or comfort of the service.
Accident-free operations are fundamentally the result of careful
operating practices on all levels - this includes aircraft construction,
maintenance, ground dispatching and pilot technique - all operating
personnel on every air carrier must vigilantly promote safety.
Public accident investigation hearings tend to take the mystery out
of aircraft accidents and to let the public know what really happened
and that effective measures can and are being taken to prevent recur-
rence. Investigations focus attention upon the breaks in safe operating
procedure so that corrective steps may be taken to prevent future
accidents.
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Defects of Present Organization
In the field of aircraft investigation there are two organizational
problems that require attention. The first involves duplication in field
investigations between the Board and the Administrator, and the
second involves securing impartiality of accident investigation and de-
termination.
Duplication: As has been shown, as part of the Administrator's
normal enforcement duties, his field staff investigates more than 90
per cent of all aircraft accidents to determine whether there have been
violations of the Civil Air Regulations. The Board, on the other hand,
has the specific statutory duty of both investigating and determining
the causes of these same accidents. The Board has never had the ap-
propriations to investigate all accidents and has never considered that
this was necessary in order to ascertain the probable cause of many
accidents. In order to accomplish the most with its staff the Board
investigates and reports on only the more disastrous accidents and those
for which the cause of the accident is obscure and therefore show a
likelihood of revealing possible corrective measures. It usually invites
the CAA to participate in its field investigations.
This arrangement has caused duplication and at times friction be-
tween the staffs with regard to their respective duties at the scene of
accidents and at hearings. It is undesirable for two groups of techni-
cians representing the federal government performing similar investi-
gation services in the field at the same time. However, the investiga-
tion of an accident and the public hearing to determine the cause
thereof are inseparably a part of the same inquiry. Should the Board
hold public hearings to determine the causes of aircraft accidents with-
out making its own investigation, it would have to rely solely upon
the facts developed by the CAA. Thus, the Board would be limited in
its findings to that evidence developed solely by that agency; and by
virtue of the Administrator's responsibilities, it is possible that essen-
tial evidence pertinent to the investigation of an accident might not
become available.
Should the CAA be assigned the responsibility for on the spot in-
vestigations of aircraft accidents, that agency would be placed in the
position of investigating itself, reporting itself, and making recom-
mendations to itself for corrective or preventive action wherever the
CAA was the responsible agency for approving the matter under in-
vestigation. For example, since World War II, in the air carrier field,
four new types of transport aircraft have been placed in scheduled air
carrier service. Three of these types developed major defects, which
resulted in several disasters in which many lives were lost. Each of
these aircraft were certificated as airworthy by the CAA. Defects in the
aircraft were not disclosed until after a disaster had occurred and
were then brought out and made public by a thorough investigation
of the accidents by the CAB acting independently.
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Regardless of whether CAA or CAB conducted these investigations,
it is desirable that technical specialists and others who have extensive
experience in organizing necessary custodial, search and research facili-
ties be available. For this reason, at least so far as the major air carrier
accidents go, it is unlikely that the investigation can ever be completely
decentralized. While some decentralization is now in effect, the
Board's area staffs are supplemented by specialists and others from
Washington, and presumably the CAA would have to follow this same
technique to obtain the same competence even with its large field force
and, accordingly, there do not appear to be any savings which might be
derived from a transfer of on the spot investigation to the Administra-
tion.
Impartiality. The proper agency to make the field investigations
raises the second question of impartiality. Since the abolition of the
independent Air Safety Board in 1940 the Air Line Pilot's Association
has advocated re-establishment of an independent three-man Air Safety
Board.9 The Association contends that neither the CAB, making the
operating regulations, nor the CAA, administering the regulations,
can be expected to impartially determine the cause of accidents.
The Association points out that accidents may occasionally be due
to faulty regulations, faulty inspection, certification or operation of
federal facilities, and that no Government agency will involuntarily
place blame for an accident upon itself by criticizing its own judgment
in performing its regulatory duties or in installing or operating air
navigation facilities.
Extensive inquiries into these charges have failed to uncover any
specific instance of withholding blame from itself, but the general logic
of the ALPA contention cannot be refuted, but complete impartiality
of the investigating agency would be desirable if consistent with other
organizational problems.
Proposals for Handling Aircraft Accident Investigations
The President's Air Policy Commission recommended re-establish-
ment of an independent Air Safety Board (Report page 138) and the
Congressional Aviation Policy Board recommended appointment of
an independent Director of Air Safety Investigation (Recommenda-
tion No. 2). The two recommendations differ principally in that the
Congressional Board felt that accident investigation and analysis could
best be handled by a single responsible individual, but each report
stressed the need for impartial and thorough investigations.
Hearings held in April, 1948, on a bill to set up an independent
Director of Air Safety, as recommended by the Congressional Aviation
9 Hearings on "Safety in Air Navigation" before House Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 80th Cong., 1st sess., Part 1, p. 453, Statement and
testimony of David L. Behncke, President, ALPA. See also Hearings on H.R. 5561
before same committee, 81st Cong., 2nd sess. (February 1950).
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Policy Board, brought out a number of different views as to the best
organization to secure impartial accident investigation.'" The CAB
Chairman did not oppose the proposal but considered it unnecessary.
The Department of Commerce witness considered that the proposal
showed a lack of faith in CAA and CAB officials charged with safety
responsibilities and that it would create unnecessary duplication of
personnel. Industry in general was indifferent except that the airline
pilots strongly favor a Board of three to five specialists and consider
air safety "too important to be trusted to one man."
Public Law 872, effective July 1, 1948, authorized the CAB to
delegate to the CAA such duties as it sees fit with regard to accident
investigation. This is intended to clarify and legalize the present role
of the CAA in investigating the vast majority of accidents.
Recommendations to Hoover Commission's Committee on
Regulatory Commissions
The solution of the organizational problem of securing impartiality
of accident investigation is tied up with the selection of the agency that
should promulgate Civil Air Regulations. It has heretofore been
recommended that this function be given to the Administrator with
the right of discretionary appeal in the CAB. If this recommendation
is accepted then the CAB will be freed from its primary responsibility
for making safety regulations.
It is recommended that the Board retain responsibility for accident
"investigation" and "determination." The principle of delegating
accident investigation responsibility to the CAA, as authorized by
Public Law 872, with respect to minor accidents should be encouraged.
In a large portion of non-air carrier accidents, because of their rela-
tively minor significance, the CAA would be in a position to determine
readily the cause of the accident. In other cases, however, the report of
the accident investigation would be forwarded simultaneously to the
Board for accident determination and to the Administrator for neces-
sary enforcement and administrative action.
In carrying out its responsibilities, the Board would hold public
hearings before an Examiner specializing in accident investigations,
hear the reports of its investigating team, the carrieri, the manufac-
turer, the pilot, and the general public. Upon the basis of information
thus assembled the Board would make public a finding as to the
probable cause of the accident.
Reasons for Recommendation. It is recognized that this is not a
perfect solution to the problem of securing impartiality of accident
investigation, but appears to be the most desirable of available choices.
The establishment of a separate government agency or director for
10 See hearings on "Independent Office of Air Safety," H.R. 6144, before Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House of Representatives, 80th
Cong., 2nd Sess., April 20, 1948.
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the sole purpose of investigating and determining the cause of accidents
would be very expensive and out of proportion to the benefits that
may reasonably be expected. Such an agency would build up an
extensive field staff of engineers and analysts and duplicate the field
force of CAA.
Moreover, even an independent safety Board would tend to lose its
impartiality in an inevitable endeavor to maintain consistency in its
own recommendations. It would soon have the same interests as CAA
and CAB to defend its earlier actions and to cast suspicion or blame
in other directions. Finally, at times when public concern over aircraft
accidents is aroused, an independent Board would be under tremen-
dous pressure to recommend regulations which might be ultimately
harmful to aviation safety.
Undoubtedly the CAB will occasionally find itself determining the
cause of accidents involving regulations that it approved on appeal
from the CAA. To this extent impartiality is sacrificed to avoid the
expense, confusion and doubtful benefits of creating a new agency.
The emphasis in accident determinations, of course, should be less
on fixing blame than on developing the chain of events leading up to
the accident and on recommendations that will insure against their
recurrence in the future.
Any Government agency holding public hearings and issuing acci-
dent reports should endeavor to keep the aircraft industry, CAA and
the CAB alerted to criticism, and at the same time to retain public
confidence that everything possible is being done for public safety. It
is believed that the CAB can best do this by determining the causes
of the most important and disastrous accidents by public hearings.
